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In this paper, I revisit a topic about which I wrote twenty years ago.  In ‘Induction and 
Natural Kinds’ I offered a metaphysical solution to the epistemological problem of induction.  
The solution drew on the insights of Hilary Kornblith about the relationship between 
induction and natural kinds.  In a departure from Kornblith, I employed Brian Ellis’s account 
of natural kinds, which I found more plausible than the account of kinds to which Kornblith 
himself subscribed. 
The problem of induction is a problem of circularity.  Our spontaneous reaction to the 
question of how to justify induction is that it has been reliable in the past so will continue to 
be so in future.  But to reason in this way is to employ induction to justify itself, which is to 
argue in a circle.  In my own attempt to justify induction, I employ an inference to the best 
explanation of the reliability of induction.  But inference to best explanation and induction 
are both forms of ampliative inference.  I therefore employ ampliative inference to support 
ampliative inference.  Hence my approach also falls foul of the problem of circularity. 
In this paper, I return to the topic.  I take the threat of circularity to be genuine, though 
perhaps it may be mitigated.  I now wish to suggest that there is a way to avoid the 
circularity.  The way to avoid the circularity is to recognize that it is the way the world is that 
grounds the reliability of induction, not the inference which we employ to establish the 
grounds of such reliability.  My aim in this paper is to explain this way of avoiding the 
problem of induction.  Before turning to that task, some background must be provided. 
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In section 2 I discuss the relationship between metaphysics and epistemology as it 
pertains to the problem of induction.  In the present context, I assume a reliabilist theory of 
epistemic justification, and I focus exclusively on enumerative rather than non-enumerative 
induction.  I outline these assumptions in section 3.  Section 4 presents the objection that the 
approach falls prey to the charge of circularity.  In Section 5 I outline the relevant aspects of 
Kornblith’s account of induction.  In section 6 I briefly present Ellis’s theory of kinds.  In 
section 7, I present my own view.  In section 8 I respond to the circularity objection.  In 
section 9, I consider an objection that may be raised against my response.  Section 10 
presents a brief conclusion. 
 
2. A metaphysical starting-point 
W.V.O. Quine’s paper, ‘Natural Kinds’ (1969), is an ancestor of the approach to induction 
that I propose.  Quine argues on evolutionary grounds that our subjective similarity spacings 
reflect real divisions in nature.  As he famously put the point, “Creatures inveterately wrong 
in their inductions have a pathetic but praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing their 
young” (1969, p. 126).  Quine recognizes that his appeal to evolutionary considerations leads 
in a circle.  It employs the inductively based theory of evolution to provide the rationale for 
induction.  But he declines to take the charge of circularity seriously, remarking that there is 
“no first philosophy” (1969, p. 127). 
On one way of understanding first philosophy, epistemology is prior to metaphysics.1  
We must first establish that we are able to have knowledge.  Only once this is done, may we 
proceed to the task of determining how the world actually is.  This is a traditional thought in 
                                                          
1 One need not take epistemology to be first philosophy.  In his (2009, chapter 6), Ellis argues that the ontology 




philosophy familiar from Descartes’s Meditations on First Philosophy.   Descartes seeks to 
determine what may be known with certainty.  He arrives at the view that certainty requires 
clear and distinct ideas.  Only then does he turn to the question of how to show that we have 
knowledge of the external world.  Thus, for Descartes, epistemology is first philosophy.  He 
seeks to show that we are able to have knowledge before turning to the nature and existence 
of the external world. 
I propose an inversion of this Cartesian order.  In at least one instance, metaphysics is 
prior to epistemology.  We must first establish that something metaphysical is the case.  
Based on this, we may proceed to solve the epistemological problem. 
I wish to argue that we should adopt a metaphysical stance as starting-point before 
turning to the problem of induction.2   The problem of induction is how to provide a non-
circular justification of induction:  how may we justify induction without relying upon 
induction itself in the course of the justification?  My suggestion is that it is the way the 
world is that makes induction reliable.  The world contains natural kinds whose members 
have essential properties.  Possession of essential properties by the members of natural kinds 
is what makes inductive inference reliable.  The trick is to show that this appeal to the way 
the world is does not proceed in a circular manner. 
 
3. Reliabilism and enumerative induction 
I will assume a reliabilist account of epistemic justification.  In seeking to justify induction, I 
aim only to provide an account of the reliability of induction.  For present purposes, if a 
satisfactory account of the reliability of induction can be given, that suffices to justify 
                                                          




induction.  There is no need to go on to argue that we are justified to employ a reliable form 
of inference or belief-formation.3 
To simplify matters, I focus on enumerative induction.  For example, suppose we 
infer that all platypuses have webbed feet because all of the platypuses that we have observed 
have had webbed feet.  This is an instance of enumerative induction.  In such an inference, 
we generalize from a limited number of observed items to a claim about all members of the 
kind to which the items belong.  My thesis is that such enumerative induction is grounded in 
natural kinds.  It is because all members of the natural kind platypus have webbed feet that 
the inductive inference from observed to unobserved platypuses yields a correct conclusion.4 
For present purposes, the question of the applicability of my account to more 
sophisticated forms of induction may be safely set to one side.  This should not be taken to 
suggest that all induction is enumerative.  Nor is it to suggest that non-enumerative forms of 
induction are unimportant.  I seek to provide a justification for induction, not an account of 
all of our inductive practices.  If the approach succeeds in the case of enumerative induction, 
it may plausibly be extended to other forms of induction.  If the approach fails to do justice to 
enumerative induction, it is unlikely to provide suitable warrant for non-enumerative forms of 
induction. 
This is simply a matter of taking things one step at a time.  If enumerative induction 
may be justified in the way that I propose, then it is worth exploring the implications of the 
                                                          
3 Those of a more internalist persuasion may baulk at my use of the term ‘justification’ in the context of a 
generally reliabilist approach to induction.  To partially assuage such qualms, I will simply mention Ernest 
Sosa’s suggestion that there is a further sense of ‘justify’ in addition to the idea of justification of a belief on the 
basis of a state with propositional content (Sosa 1980, p. 7).  An action may be justified by means of its 
consequences rather than on the basis of some propositional content.  It is this latter sense of ‘justified’ that is 
apposite here.  
 
4  It may be objected that having webbed feet is not an essential property of duckbill platypuses.  If a platypus 
were born without webbed feet, it would still be a platypus.  This may be granted without compromising the 
basic point.  Rather than webbed feet, we may substitute instead a more suitable candidate for essential property 
of platypus, perhaps a particular genetic code.  The induction about webbed feet would go through because 
having webbed feet is a property that depends upon the essential property. 
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approach for less basic forms of induction.  If the approach fails in the case of enumerative 
induction, there is little hope of extending it to other forms of induction. 
 
4. The charge of circularity 
‘Induction and Natural Kinds’ originally appeared in 1997.  At the time, I was concerned that 
my approach might fall prey to the charge of circularity.  Hence I explicitly addressed the 
issue in the paper.  A revised version of the paper was included in my book, Scientific 
Realism and the Rationality of Science (2008).  In the revised version, I sought to improve the 
approach by drawing on work by David Papineau.  Though I remain sympathetic to 
Papineau’s view, I now have a further proposal to make, which has been prompted by some 
critical comments by Stathis Psillos. 
In his review of Scientific Realism and the Rationality of Science, Psillos presents a 
number of objections to my approach to induction.  The chief objection is that the approach 
employs ampliative inference to justify ampliative inference, and thereby fails to avoid 
circularity.  Psillos writes as follows: 
Sankey’s gambit is smart:  it assumes the existence of natural kinds to explain 
the reliability of induction.  Should it work, it promises to avoid the well-known charge 
of circularity.  The move from the success of scientific methodology to the existence of 
natural kinds is abductive:  the existence of natural kinds is taken to be the best 
explanation of the success of science.  If so, the existence of natural kinds can do 
apparently non-circular work in justifying induction.… it is wrong to believe that IBE 
can bypass the problem of induction – since the problem concerns, at bottom, the very 
idea of an ampliative but rational method.  IBE has no atemporal warrant – as Hume in 
effect observed when he criticized a standard appeal to active powers to justify 
induction…. Nor is it obvious that essential properties explain the reliability of 
induction in a non-circular way, since, as Sankey himself notes, ‘good inductive 
inferences project essential properties, whereas bad ones project accidental properties’.  
Unless there is an independent way to classify inductions into good and bad ones, 
essentialism cannot ground the reliability of induction.  (Psillos 2009, p. 682) 
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In this passage, Psillos raises a number of critical points against my position.  I will focus on 
what I understand to be the central objection.  I take the central objection to be that my 
approach fails to avoid the charge of circularity. 
In the revised version of ‘Induction and Natural Kinds’, I sought to forestall the 
circularity objection by adopting an approach with which Psillos appears to be sympathetic 
(cf. Psillos 1999, p. 82).  This is the approach adopted by David Papineau in his inductive 
defence of the reliability of induction (1992).  Papineau argues by induction from the past 
reliability of induction to its general reliability.   Against the charge of circularity, Papineau 
appeals to the distinction between premise and rule circularity.  A premise circular argument 
contains the conclusion itself in the premises.  A rule circular argument uses a rule of 
inference (e.g. induction, deduction) to support the rule itself.   The conclusion that induction 
is reliable does not appear as a premise in the argument for the reliability of induction.  
Papineau’s inductivist defence of induction is not therefore premise circular.  But it is rule 
circular. 
I continue to regard the idea of rule circularity as an important tool to be employed in 
the inductive justification of induction.  But I now wish to propose another way to avoid the 
charge of circularity.  My goal here is to explain this other way.  Before I turn to that, let me 
describe the approach to induction in greater detail.  The approach is not new.  Nor is it mine 
alone. 
 
5. Hilary Kornblith on induction 
My approach to the problem of induction is related to the venerable idea that our use of 
induction rests upon a principle of the uniformity of nature.  In my view, induction is reliable 
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because the world makes it so.  In effect, I endorse a version of the principle of uniformity 
according to which induction is justified as a result of nature being uniform.  This principle is 
not something that we know a priori to be true.  Nor is it to be thought of as a logical 
presupposition of inductive inference.  The principle is an empirical claim about the nature of 
reality.  It is an a posteriori metaphysical claim. 
I draw explicitly on the position developed by Hilary Kornblith in his book, Inductive 
Inference and its Natural Ground (1993).  Kornblith presents an account of the reliability of 
inductive inference which rests on two key claims.  On the one hand, the world has a natural 
kind structure.  That is, the world contains individual items which are members of natural 
kinds.  On the other hand, our minds reflect the natural kind structure of the world.  We 
conceptualize the world in a way that is sensitive to its natural kind structure.  Moreover, our 
inductive inferences presuppose the existence of such a structure.  Given the way our minds 
reflect the kind structure of the world, there is a “dovetail fit” between mind and the world.  
This dovetail fit explains the reliability of inductive inference. 
In my account of induction, I emphasize the role of natural kinds in explaining the 
reliability of induction.  I focus primarily on Kornblith’s view that natural kinds provide the 
ground for induction rather than on his account of how the human mind fits with the natural 
kind structure of the world.  But Kornblith is surely right that an account must be given of 
how we conceptually grasp natural kinds and reason inductively in a manner that is informed 
by the natural kind structure of the world.  I do not have anything substantive to say about 
this aspect of the position.  I shall simply assume that an approach along the lines developed 
by Kornblith is well-motivated and in broad terms correct. 
What sort of argument does Kornblith provide for the approach?  Kornblith argues 
that the natural kind structure of the world is the best explanation of the reliability of 
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induction.  His use of this form of argument is especially apparent when he considers the role 
played by natural kinds in inductive inference in the sciences.  In that context, his argument 
takes a form that is familiar from the literature on scientific realism: 
If the scientific categories of mature sciences did not correspond, at least 
approximately to real kinds in nature, but instead merely grouped objects together 
on the basis of salient observable properties which somehow answer to our 
interests, it would be utterly miraculous that inductions using these scientific 
categories tend to issue in accurate predictions.  Inductive inferences can only 
work, short of divine intervention, if there is something in nature binding together 
the properties which we use to identify kinds.  Our inductive inferences in science 
have worked remarkably well, and, moreover, we have succeeded in identifying 
the ways in which the observable properties which draw kinds to our attention are 
bound together in nature.  In light of these successes, we can hardly go on to 
doubt the existence of the very kinds which serve to explain how such successes 
were even possible. (1993, pp. 41-2) 
In this passage, Kornblith’s inference to the best explanation of reliable inductive inference in 
science bears a clear and striking resemblance to the “no miracles” argument for scientific 
realism made famous by Hilary Putnam.  Given this reliance on an ampliative form of 
inference, however, Kornblith’s approach would appear to be vulnerable to the same charge 
of circularity as is my own version of the approach.5 
As indicated, Kornblith’s account of induction rests on the co-occurrence of properties 
among members of a natural kind.  In order to explain such co-occurrence of properties, 
Kornblith adopts the homeostatic property cluster (HPC) account of natural kinds proposed 
by Richard Boyd.  On Boyd’s account, natural kinds possess groups of properties which enter 
into a relation of homeostatic equilibrium: 
A natural kind is a cluster of properties which, when realized together in the same 
substance, work to maintain and reinforce each other, even in the face of changes 
in the environment.  (1993, p. 35) 
                                                          
5  As Kornblith does not address the charge of circularity, it is difficult to determine how he might respond to it.  




On the HPC account, only certain groups of properties are able to co-occur in stable 
assemblages.  It is this fact about the way in which properties may be arranged in only a 
limited number of ways that provides the basis for reliable inductive inference: 
Because there are natural kinds, and thus clusters of properties which reside in 
homeostatic relationships, we may reliably infer the presence of some of these 
properties from the presence of others.  In short, natural kinds make reliable 
inductive inference possible, because were it not for the existence of these 
homeostatic clusters, the presence of any set of properties would be fully 
compatible with the presence of any other. (1993, p. 36) 
For Kornblith, the way in which certain groups of properties are able to reside together in 
homeostatic equilibrium is what provides the metaphysical underpinning of inductive 
inference.  This is why he thinks of natural kinds as providing “the natural ground of 
inductive inference” (1993, p. 36). 
 No doubt, the HPC account may be fruitfully applied to natural kinds within the life 
sciences.  It is less clear that it may be extended to non-biological kinds.  The account rests 
on a metaphor that applies in the case of living organisms.  It does not readily generalize to 
physical entities other than organisms.  For this reason, I choose not to follow Kornblith in 
adopting Boyd’s account of natural kinds. 
 
6. Brian Ellis on natural kinds 
My own preference is to adopt an essentialist theory of natural kinds of the kind proposed by 
Brian Ellis.  Such an account seems to me to provide a more solid foundation for inductive 
inference than does the HPC account.6 
                                                          
6  I do not wish to rule out the possibility that a position like the HPC account might be combined with the 
essentialist view of Ellis’s that we are about to consider.  The HPC account seems to be designed for biological 
rather than physical kinds.  By contrast, Ellis’s account is designed primarily for physical and chemical kinds.  
Ellis considers biological kinds to be clusters of microspecies (2002, p. 31), which suggests there might be room 
for reconciliation with the Boydian view. 
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  According to Ellis, individual entities such as electrons belong to natural kinds.  But 
individual entities are not the only things that belong to natural kinds.  In addition to natural 
kinds of entities or objects, there are also properties such as charge and mass, as well as 
relations such as gravitational attraction or chemical bonding.  Moreover, there are natural 
kinds of events and processes, such as chemical reactions or radioactive decay. 
The world in which we live is highly structured.  This is largely due to the fact that it 
is divided up into categorically distinct natural kinds.  Natural kinds have objectively existing 
boundaries which we discover.  They do not overlap or fade into each other.  The borderline 
between them is not an arbitrary or blurred one that depends on a human classificatory 
decision or convention.  The only way that kinds may overlap is by way of a relation of 
inclusion such as the relation of genus to species.  The system of natural kinds forms a 
hierarchical structure.  More specific kinds belong to more general kinds.  General kinds 
possess essential properties which are also found in more specific kinds.  The specific kinds 
within a general kind all possess the essential properties of the general kind. 
For Ellis, the essential properties of natural kinds are intrinsic properties shared by all 
members of the same kind.  The essential properties of natural kinds of things are 
dispositional.  They have “the nature of powers, capacities and propensities” (1999, p. 19).  
Natural kinds are characterized by the intrinsic causal powers of the things that belong to 
those kinds.  This permits a connection to be drawn between laws of nature and natural kinds.  
Laws of nature describe the essences of natural kinds.  They are statements that are made true 
by the causal powers of things that belong to natural kinds.  The truth-makers for laws of 
nature are the causal powers or intrinsic dispositions of natural kinds of things.  Because the 
causal powers or dispositions are essential properties of natural kinds, the laws of nature are 
not contingent.  They are metaphysically necessary, grounded in the essential properties of 
natural kinds of things.   
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7. My approach 
On the view that I propose, induction is justified because nature is uniform.  There is a sense, 
as we have seen, in which my approach involves a principle of the uniformity of nature.  But 
the principle of uniformity is not to be understood in the way such principles are usually 
understood.  It is not an overarching or blanket statement to the effect that the future 
resembles the past.  Nor is it simply a global statement that nature is uniform. 
The principle relates specifically to the essential properties of natural kinds.  On this 
version of the principle, nature is uniform in the precise sense that there are natural kinds 
whose members all possess a shared set of essential properties.  In light of the relation that 
obtains between natural kinds and laws of nature, to say that nature is uniform is to say that it 
is governed by laws of nature.  On the essentialist view that I take over from Ellis, laws of 
nature are grounded in the causal powers that are the essential properties of natural kinds of 
things.  
What I wish to suggest is as follows:  when we use induction to form a belief about 
the future we are justified in doing so because nature is in fact uniform.  It is uniform in the 
sense that there are natural kinds of things which possess sets of essential properties.  All 
members of a kind have the same essential properties.  Unobserved members of a kind 
possess the same essential properties as observed members of the kind.  The fact that 
observed and unobserved members of a kind possess the same essential properties is what 
makes induction reliable.  When we predict that an unobserved object will have an essential 
property that observed objects of the same kind have our prediction will be correct.  It will be 
correct because all members of the kind have essential properties in common.  It is because 
all members of the kind have the property in common that our prediction is correct. 
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Of course, the conclusion of an inductive argument need not be correct.  On the 
present account, one way in which an inductive inference may lead to a false conclusion is 
for essential properties to be mistakenly identified as such.  If a non-essential property were 
mistakenly taken to be an essential property, future unobserved members of the kind may fail 
to have the property mistakenly thought to be essential to the kind.  In such a situation, the 
prediction that a future unobserved member of the kind will possess the property in question 
may be mistaken. 
As so far stated, the account requires two qualifications.  The first relates to the 
apparent restriction of inductive inference to essential properties of natural kinds.  The second 
relates to the question of how inductive inference may be employed with respect to items that 
do not belong to natural kinds. 
With regard to the first point, I have presented the account in terms of the essential 
properties of natural kinds.  But this is an oversimplification.  Inductive inference need not be 
restricted to essential properties.  There may be non-essential properties that depend on 
essential properties in a systematic way.  Where there are non-essential properties that depend 
in a systematic way on essential properties, it may be possible for there to be reliable 
inductive inference that ranges over such dependent non-essential properties. 
To take a particular example, being black is unlikely to be an essential property of 
ravens.  In the case of ravens, the property of being black depends in some systematic way on 
facts about the genetic make-up of ravens that typically give rise to black pigmentation.  The 
essential properties of ravens will likely be found within the genetic code of ravens.7  Hence, 
the reliability of an inductive inference about the blackness of ravens is not due to the fact 
                                                          
7 A qualification may be in order.  Arguably, being a bird is essential to being a raven.  Having a beak, feathers 





that blackness is an essential property of ravens.  It is due to the fact that the blackness of 
ravens depends in some systematic way on features of the genetic code of ravens that 
constitute the essential properties of ravens.  
Second, as so far presented, my account of induction applies to inductive inference 
about members of natural kinds.  But we routinely infer by induction about members of non-
natural kinds, such as trains, trams and airplanes.  Surely, inductive inference is not restricted 
to the essential properties of natural kinds and the non-essential properties that systematically 
depend upon the essential properties of natural kinds.  We are perfectly able to reason by 
induction about items that do not belong to natural kinds.8 
In the original development of the approach, I was inclined to adopt an 
uncompromising stance with respect to this issue.  I initially took the view that induction 
about entities that do not belong to a natural kind may only be reliable to the extent that the 
entities are composed of parts that do belong to natural kinds.  It is only in virtue of the fact 
that the component parts consist of material belonging to natural kinds that inference about 
members of non-natural kinds may be reliable.  I found encouragement for this stance in a 
remark due to T.E. Wilkerson:  “because there are no very specific real essences that make 
rubbish rubbish, and tables tables, I cannot even in principle make sound inductive 
projections about rubbish as such or tables as such” (1995, p. 32).  Wilkerson’s suggestion 
was that only natural kind predicates are projectible and thus able to be employed in 
inductive inference.9  This seemed, in turn, to suggest that reliable induction might only be 
                                                          
8 The objection may be put another way.  Induction is a non-deductive form of inference in which the premises 
provide support for the conclusion but do not deductively entail the truth of the conclusion.  Nothing about the 
definition of induction implies that induction must be restricted to natural kinds. 
 
9 Wilkerson’s mention of projectibility brings out another attractive feature of the present approach, namely, that 
it promises to resolve Goodman’s problem of the grue emeralds. But it may not all be plain sailing.  As Bruce 
Langtry has pointed out to me, ‘grue’ is defined in terms of ‘green’ and ‘blue’ which may be natural kind 




grounded in natural kinds, since it is only the regularity built into natural kinds that may 
provide the basis for such reliability. 
The problem with such an uncompromising stance is that there are cases of apparently 
sound inductive inference not underpinned by the existence of a natural kind.  Apart from 
cases in which we infer inductively about items that belong to non-natural kinds, we may also 
make legitimate inductive inferences about singular items considered simply as individual 
things rather than as instances of a kind.10  Because there are cases of reliable induction for 
which the existence of natural kinds does not appear to be responsible, a less 
uncompromising stance may be appropriate.  Hence, I wish only to assert that my account of 
induction is able to explain the reliability of an important and presumably large class of cases 
of inductive inference, namely, those in which induction applies to members of natural kinds, 
as well as to items consisting of natural kinds which are responsible for the regularity picked 
out by the induction.  It remains to be explained how and why induction is reliable in cases 
where the presence of natural kinds plays no apparent role. 
 
8. The objection again 
I now return to the problem that this paper seeks to address.  As we have seen, my aim is to 
provide an account of the reliability of inductive inference and thereby to justify induction.  
Does this approach avoid the problem of induction?  According to Psillos, my approach 
employs an ampliative inference to argue in support of an ampliative inference.   If this is 
right, the approach seems not to avoid the charge of circularity at all. 
                                                          
10  For example, we may infer from the fact that a particular potted plant has thrived after being watered that it 
always thrives after being watered.  Such an inductive inference need make no reference to the kind to which the 
plant belongs, and, indeed may be restricted specifically to the one plant under consideration.  (I owe this 
example to Greg Restall.) 
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Let me state the objection more precisely.  The argument for the existence of natural 
kinds proceeds by inference to best explanation (IBE).  A similar argument is employed to 
support the claim that induction is reliable because it is grounded in natural kinds.  But IBE 
and induction are both forms of ampliative inference.  So an ampliative inference is 
employed to justify an ampliative inference.  The circularity is immediately apparent.  
As mentioned previously, I earlier sought to forestall this objection by appeal to 
Papineau’s distinction between rule and premise circularity.  Though I continue to hold that 
this distinction has a role to play in a reliabilist justification of induction, I now favour 
another response to the circularity objection.  Put simply, the response is that the IBE is not 
what does the justificatory work in the justification of induction.  It is the natural kinds that 
provide the justification for induction. 
To develop the point in more detail, it is important to reflect upon the role played by 
IBE in the account.  There are two places where IBE is employed.  First, an IBE is employed 
to argue for the existence of natural kinds.  Second, an IBE is used to argue that the existence 
of real kinds in nature is what makes induction reliable.  But notice that on this account the 
reliability of induction does not itself depend upon the IBE.  What underpins the reliability of 
induction is not the IBE.  It is the natural kind structure of the world that makes induction 
reliable.  IBE has nothing to do with it. 
To see this, suppose that we correctly employ induction to predict that a previously 
unobserved member of a kind will in future be found to have some specific property.  On my 
account, the explanation of why the induction leads to a correct prediction is that it correctly 
picks out a real pattern in nature.  Thus, it is the way the world is that makes the inference 
reliable.  It is not the inference to the best explanation of the reliability of induction that 
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makes the induction itself reliable.  The reliability of the inductive inference does not depend 
upon the IBE. 
The point may be presented in another way.  It may be illustrated in terms of a once 
popular distinction in the philosophy of science.  Karl Popper and Hans Reichenbach drew a 
distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification.  They 
distinguished between the way in which one arrives at a theory (the context of discovery) and 
the way in which the theory is justified (the context of justification).  The initial inspiration or 
creative insight that gives rise to a theory need have nothing to do with the tests or 
experiments which provide empirical evidence on the basis of which the theory is to be 
accepted.   
A similar point applies to the present approach to induction.  IBE is employed to 
argue that the world has a natural kind structure, and that this structure underlies the 
reliability of inductive inference.  This is the context of discovery.  We employ IBE in the 
context of discovery to argue for an account of the natural ground of induction.  But our use 
of IBE to argue for the account is not what provides the ground for induction.  What justifies 
our use of induction is the fact that the world is a certain way.  It is the natural kind structure 
of the world that makes induction reliable.  In short, IBE is how we discover the ground of 
induction.  It is not what grounds the induction.11 
In sum, I propose an argument to the effect that induction is reliable, and so justified, 
because the world has a natural kind structure that makes induction reliable.  If I am right, the 
approach is not circular.  It is not circular because the IBE is not what grounds induction.  It 
                                                          
11 I do not think that the analogy between the two context distinction and the present approach to induction is a 
perfect analogy.  But the distinction between the two contexts helps to illustrate the distinction between, on the 
one hand, the argument for the account of reliable induction and, on the other hand, the natural kind structure 
that underlies the reliability of induction and thereby provides the warrant for induction. 
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is the world that grounds induction.  The only role played by IBE is to discover that natural 
kinds are what make induction reliable. 
 
9. A further objection 
In the previous section, I attempted to meet the charge of circularity by arguing that the 
justification of induction rests on the natural kind structure of the world rather than upon the 
IBE given on behalf of this account of induction.  I will now consider an objection that might 
be raised against this response to the charge of circularity.  The objection might be presented 
in the following terms:  
“Granted, if natural kinds exist, induction will be reliable.  But we must use IBE to 
arrive at a justified belief in the existence of natural kinds.  Moreover, we must use IBE to 
justify the belief that the reliability of induction is based on natural kinds.  This means that 
the justification of induction depends upon an IBE about the reliability of induction.  So, in 
the end, you use ampliative inference to justify induction.” 
On the view that I have proposed in this paper, induction is justified because the 
existence of natural kinds makes inductive inference reliable.  As I have pointed out, an IBE 
is employed to argue for this view of the warrant of induction.  But I wish to deny that the 
IBE employed in the argument plays the role in justifying induction that the objection 
assumes it to play.  
The objection is based on an internalist assumption that we must form a justified 
belief in the reliability of induction in order to be justified in our use of induction.12  But I do 
                                                          
12  I interpret the notion of justification employed in the objection in internalist terms.  However, the notion of 
justification could be interpreted in reliabilist terms.  If so, it is not clear that the objection poses a serious threat 
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not see why we must form such a belief in order to be justified in the use of induction.  The 
existence of natural kinds would render our use of induction reliable even if we did not 
perform the IBE and thereby come to hold the present view of induction.  In order for use of 
induction to be justified, there is no need for us to know or to justifiably believe that 
induction is warranted by the existence of natural kinds.  
To employ the above internalist assumption against the position that I have presented 
begs the question against the reliabilist stance adopted here.  But, quite apart from that, the 
objection relies upon a contentious view about what is required for justification.  The 
objection relies on an assumption similar in spirit to the infamous KK-thesis that in order to 
know we must know that we know.  In particular, it assumes that in order be justified in our 
use of induction we must hold a justified belief that induction is justified.  This in turn 
assumes that in order to be justified in a belief we must justifiably believe that we are 
justified in the belief. 
It would be wrong to reject such an assumption out of hand.  At the same time, it 
would be wrong to adopt the assumption without strong positive arguments in its favour.  
More generally, the assumption is so fundamentally at odds with the approach adopted here 
that it is more than just an objection.  It is a wholesale rejection of the approach to the 
problem of induction that I have sought to sketch in this paper.  
 
10. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have attempted to respond to the charge of circularity raised by Stathis Psillos 
against my reliabilist justification of induction.  Against the charge that my account employed 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
to the approach.  Nor, however, is it clear that the assumption on which the objection is based need be granted 
even if justification is understood in reliabilist terms. 
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ampliative inference to justify an ampliative inference, I have argued that what grounds 
induction is not the IBE presented for the reliabilist account of induction.  It is the natural 
kind structure of the world that makes induction reliable.  Given this, the circularity may be 
avoided. 
 I conclude in programmatic terms.  As indicated, I have presented the position as an 
account of the reliability of enumerative induction.  If the account can be sustained, then it 
may be worthwhile exploring the prospects of extending the approach to non-enumerative 
forms of induction.  We have also seen that there appear to be cases of inductive inference 
which do not apply to natural kinds.  It remains to be seen whether the account may be 
extended to cases where induction seems not to be applied to natural kinds or whether some 
alternative approach must be developed for cases in which induction does not apply to natural 
kinds.  These are topics for future work which must be addressed if the present approach is to 
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